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Rewriting History/Animality in J. M. Coetzee’s 
Dusklands  and Richard Flanagan’s Wanting
Brian Daniel Deyo
Abstract: This article examines two works of fiction that specu-
latively rewrite settler histories in South Africa and Australia, J. 
M. Coetzee’s Dusklands  and Richard Flanagan’s Wanting. In the 
interest of critically addressing the silences, elisions, and ideologi-
cal simplifications of imperialist histories of the colonial encoun-
ter, both texts imaginatively attend to the lived experiences of 
European settlers and indigenous peoples during the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. In their respective accounts of the co-
lonial encounter, Coetzee and Flanagan represent how racist, 
anthropocentric, and ecophobic mentalities are unsettled by af-
fective intensities that instantiate the body’s resistance to the po-
litical, economic, social, and religious logics of colonialism. Both 
authors coordinate the body’s resistance with animality, which in 
turn is posited as a kind of affective power that has the potential to 
ethically and aesthetically reconfigure the human-animal binary of 
Western discourse. This essay proposes that Coetzee and Flanagan 
attempt to resituate the human ecologically by rewriting history, 
imaginatively recuperating the value of indigenous sensibilities, 
and positively reinscribing human animality.
Keywords: ecocriticism, settler colonialism, J.M Coetzee, Richard 
Flanagan
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The song is gone; the dance
is secret with the dancers in the earth,
the ritual useless, and the tribal story
lost in an alien tale.
Judith Wright, “Bora Ring”
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Animals have been figures of ambivalence in many human cultures.1 We 
need an analytic that accounts for how and why ambivalence toward 
animals may reflect an animus toward our own animality. Moreover, we 
need to consider the way history modulates animosity toward animals 
and human animality.2 The vexed, unsettling relation to human animal-
ity played a significant role in the shaping of attitudes toward indig-
enous peoples, animals, and the environment throughout histories of 
colonial settlement. The practical consequences of such attitudes were, 
and still are, far-reaching in scope and magnitude. Val Plumwood traces 
the origins of such attitudes, which imply a “rationalist hyper-separation 
of human identity from nature,” to antiquity (8). The long-standing, 
inveterate practice of abstracting human-centered forms of reason from 
the field of nature evolved into an especially virulent stance toward em-
bodiment and materiality during the Enlightenment and became espe-
cially apparent in “historical projects of subduing and colonizing nature 
[that] have come to full flower only in modernity” (Plumwood 15). 
These historical projects, driven as they were by Cartesian assump-
tions of the uniqueness, power, and integrity of reason, were also aided 
by European religious ideas on the unique destiny of “Man,” which 
poses a rather formidable contradiction. One way to parse this matter 
is to speculate whether both sides of the contradiction—the claims of 
reason and religious faith—are similarly constituted to varying degrees 
by irrational instincts for mastery and control. As Simon Estok suggests, 
“control of the natural environment, understood as a God-given right 
in Western culture, implies ecophobia,” which he defines as an “irra-
tional and groundless fear or hatred of the natural world” (4–5; empha-
sis added). Estok maintains that ecophobia, while it may manifest itself 
in a variety of ways and historical contexts, is particularly acute—even 
if subtle—in Western discourse. Referring to the Book of Genesis, he 
speculates on what may be driving its textualization of human ascend-
ancy over the natural world: “One of the constitutional moments in 
Western history has control as its key issue: the biblical imperative about 
human relations with nature gives Man (a man actually: Adam) divine 
authority to control everything that lives” (5). The biblical imperative 
to which he refers illustrates several items I believe postcolonial ecocriti-
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cism needs to attend to in its critical practice. It is, first and foremost, 
about “power and control” (Estok 5). Estok reads the imperative as con-
stitutively Western and male, sanctioned by God, and directed to the 
extra-human world in its entirety, positing “Man” as a kind of demigod. 
What remains tacit, as he wants to insist, is a kind of absent referent: 
ecophobia. And while Estok maintains ecophobia is probably universal 
inasmuch as it is a symptom of human beings’ feelings of insecurity 
with respect to the unpredictability of nature in the most general sense, 
he also suggests it may denote anxiety that what goes by the name of 
“Man” is insuperably tied to an animal body, to nature, to mortality, in 
addition to a realm of contingency over which it has limited control. 
And it is precisely this anxiety that may have been particularly unsettling 
throughout the course of settler histories. 
In the interest of theorizing ecophobia I attend in the main to two 
works by postcolonial writers that limn the psychological complexities 
the term might be made to designate: J. M. Coetzee’s Dusklands and 
Richard Flanagan’s Wanting. Coetzee and Flanagan imaginatively re-
write settler histories in South Africa and Australia, respectively. Both 
novels can be read as critical interventions that attempt to redress the 
distortions and abuses of imperial historiographies, namely those that 
represent colonial histories as part and parcel of the triumphal, fully 
legitimate achievement of European modernity. To achieve this end, 
Coetzee and Flanagan speculate on the lived immediacy of encounters 
between Europeans and indigenous peoples. 
“Hottentot, Hottentot, / I am not a Hottentot”: Unsettling Settler 
History in J. M. Coetzee’s Dusklands
Dusklands rewrites official accounts of the settler experience and explores 
how one man, Jacobus Coetzee, situates himself vis-à-vis the African 
wilderness and the indigenous peoples of Southern Africa. It dramatizes 
what Sue Kossew refers to as “the deep anxieties about identity, settle-
ment and belonging to the land that is characteristic of settler-invader 
colonies” (25). Moreover, the novella’s analytic of the colonial encounter 
works to identify and limn the affective bases of colonial racial ideol-
ogy. The radical differences of the everyday life of indigenous peoples, 
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which posed significant challenges to the economic values of European 
society, are considered in richly nuanced psychological detail, a strategic 
move Coetzee deploys to rectify the obfuscations or silences of imperial 
historiography.3 However, though Jacobus is driven into the heart of 
the “wilderness” by material necessity, his attitudes toward the so-called 
Hottentots (or Khoikhoi)4 are not easily accounted for by capitalist ide-
ology alone. Economic rationality forms only a part of the calculus of 
his representations of indigenous peoples, for he encounters a world of 
difference that fundamentally challenges the idea of his own humanity. 
Jacobus’ character is freighted with Enlightenment ideas about “Man,” 
Nature, reason, and the role of Providence in history—all of which work 
together, as a conceptual system, to posit an anthropocentric universe. 
Though he confidently situates himself at the centre of this system, his 
encounters with the land and peoples of Southern Africa radically de-
center his point of view.5 When his identity is undermined, he is prone 
to violent acts that underscore a deep-seated irrational fear of nature, 
matter, and human animality. As Coetzee intimates, Jacobus’ pathology 
is tacitly driven by an even deeper fear that, in spite of what he thinks, 
his very being is reducible to and, what is worse, bound up with nature 
in ways that belie his desires for transcendence.6 
Significantly, the indigenous peoples of South Africa are represented 
by Jacobus as animals: sunk in a sensory, sensuous body, driven by 
instinct and passion.7 Furthermore, he sees the indigene as inelucta-
bly lodged within a mechanistically conceived natural order. Thus he 
consistently imposes conceptual barriers between himself and nature, 
a realm that is always already subject to the domesticating power of 
his gaze. We see how this works via his reactions to the African wilder-
ness, which demonstrate a decidedly abstract, anthropocentric view of 
reality. As he embarks on a quest for ivory with a group of Khoikhoi 
servants, the narrative dramatizes the limitations of his point of view, 
which evinces a totalizing view of nonhuman exteriority. Armed with 
guns, beasts of burden, and a cart to carry the various accoutrements 
of civilization to defend the self against the privations and perils of the 
frontier, Jacobus can also be said to defend himself against the African 
wild with a host of ideas. One idea to which he is particularly beholden 
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is that the world he enters is governable by the powers of reason. As he 
confronts the alterity of the wilderness, he thinks:
In the wild I lose my sense of boundaries. This is a consequence 
of space and solitude. The operation of space is thus: the five 
senses stretch out from the body they inhabit, but four stretch 
out into a vacuum. The ear cannot hear, the nose cannot smell, 
the tongue cannot taste, the skin cannot feel.  .  .  . Only the 
eyes have power. The eyes are free, they reach out to the hori-
zon all around. Nothing is hidden from the eyes. As the other 
senses go numb or dumb the eyes flex and extend themselves. I 
become a spherical reflecting eye moving through the wilderness 
and ingesting it. Destroyer of wilderness . . . I am all that I see. 
Such loneliness! Not a stone, not a wretched provident ant that 
is not comprehended in this traveling sphere. What is there 
that is not me? I am a transparent sac with a black core full of 
images and a gun. (Coetzee, Dusklands 79; emphasis added)
Jacobus is represented as a disembodied consciousness that assimilates 
the singular particulars of the world in strict accordance with an ab-
stract idea: namely that everything he “sees” can be ordered and thereby 
mastered by reason.8 Note the fashion whereby the first person pro-
noun, “I,” is suggestively conflated with the “eye,” which is implicitly 
coordinated with the cogito, an intellectual power that is presumed to 
yield a fully comprehending—indeed comprehensive—knowledge of 
the landscape and its inhabitants. As David Attwell argues, the above 
meditation on boundaries parodies the “scientific discourses that have 
evolved in the wake of the Enlightenment,” thereby “laying bare the 
narrator’s subject-position,” revealing it to be, above all, a “fiction of 
self assertion” (Attwell 39, 48). Moreover, as Attwell explains, such dis-
courses are “the principal means” through which the narrator works to 
“manage” the world and “achieve self-affirmation and mastery” (39–40). 
One may also add that Jacobus’ disposition toward extra-human reality 
is extraordinarily phlegmatic, suggesting a carefully controlled, almost 
reflexive aversion to sense and feeling; thus his subjectivity seems im-
mured within a cognitive firewall that cannot be affected or touched by 
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his environs.9 Jacobus’ assertion that “only the eyes have power” suggests 
power is indeed a function of insensibility (Coetzee, Dusklands 79). And 
Coetzee’s representation of Jacobus’ rarefied mental description of “his” 
environment is so impervious to reality as to render him blind. Not 
only is he blind to his surroundings, he exalts himself with respect to 
indigenous peoples. The mind of the indigene, according to Jacobus, is 
incapable of mastering and controlling the passions; it is merely played 
upon by exteriority without the aid of reason. But there is a special 
kind of irony afoot, for Jacobus’ protestations of superiority are tellingly 
strident. One is tempted, if not compelled, to read his derogatory rep-
resentations of the indigene as symptoms of fear: the fear that he is, at 
bottom, no different, and that his pretentions to reason are none other 
than an expression of this fear. 
Jacobus’ mechanical insistence on the animality of the indigene is 
consistent with his failure to identify or understand the logics of indig-
enous society, culture, and history, and this failure is characterized as 
deeply irrational and dogmatic.10 Consider, for instance, Jacobus’ clas-
sification of a Khoikhoi camp he settles upon in his travels:
It consisted of perhaps forty huts arranged in a rough circle. . . . 
The huts were of uniform construction: bark mats and animal 
skins spread over hemispheres of supple branches that had been 
thrust into the ground and lashed together at the apex. The 
apex is open, allowing the Hottentot abed a barred view of the 
night sky. It has led to neither a special relationship with the 
sky-gods nor a Hottentot astrology. It is nothing but a smoke 
hole. (77; emphasis added)
Jacobus expresses a dark fascination with the apparent unreflective inno-
cence of the Khoikhoi, which he adduces from their failure to conceive 
of metaphysics or organized religion. As he notes earlier: “The one gulf 
that divides us from the Hottentots is our Christianity. We, however, are 
Christians, a folk with a destiny” (57). The Khoikhoi are conceived to 
be nothing but animals, and for him this is proved by the fact that they 
appear to be “locked into the present” (57). In other words, the indigene 
“does not care where he comes from or where he is going” (57–58). Thus 
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for Jacobus the human is indexed by the capacity to imagine oneself—or 
a self—within the framework of historical time. This particular concep-
tion of the human depends on a belief in divine Providence, which, of 
course, lends an illusion of legitimacy to his evangelical mission in the 
African wilderness. As he reiterates, “I am a tool in the hands of his-
tory” (106). Again, Coetzee deploys irony to satirize Jacobus’ claims to 
reason. Keeping in mind Jacobus’ figuration of the indigene as natural 
slave—“They lacked all will, they were born slaves” (74)—one cannot 
miss Jacobus’ enslavement to history: in other words, the very discourses 
that empower him as a white European male settler also divest him of 
the freedom to think, feel, imagine, and act outside of their terms.11
If the passage cited above is read as critical illustration of the triumph 
of history and the failure of the sympathetic imagination, its irony be-
comes even more complex. The fact that the apex is described neither 
as window onto revelation nor as a spur to metaphysical flights of fancy 
intimates Coetzee’s skepticism with regard to his creation’s judgments. 
The phrase “nothing but” astringently conveys a pathological dimen-
sion of settler culture, a culture that would appear to demand from the 
world explicit confirmation of the unique value and sanctity of what 
goes by the name of human experience: to be more specific, the experi-
ence of white, Christian males of European origin in the particular time 
and place Dusklands represents (Coetzee, Dusklands 77). Succinctly put, 
the attitude of contempt for the indigene’s apparent lack of interiority 
is satirized and transvalued for the reader, for Jacobus’ contempt is a 
function of his visceral, virtually unstinting commitment to a version 
of Christianity that dovetails all too neatly with the acquisitive logics of 
colonialism. 
Jacobus’ faith in himself is indeed sutured by his faith in God, which 
is in its turn tied to the idea that nothing in this world happens except 
by design. As he states:
Those of us who may momentarily doubt that we are included 
in the great system of dividends and penalties may take com-
fort in Our Lord’s observation on the fall of the sparrow: the 
sparrow is cheap but he is not forgotten. As an explorer of 
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the wilderness I have always thought myself an evangelist and 
endeavoured to bring the heathen the gospel of the sparrow, 
which falls but falls with design. (101)
Coetzee’s deliberate conflation of economic and religious terminology 
is telling. The “great system of dividends and penalties,” associated as it 
is with notions of divine justice, is related in Jacobus’ telling to what he 
later refers to as the “economy of the whole” (101). Jacobus is wedded 
to a system of ideas that redound to his economic advantage and to 
the dignity of his person, which is to say his position within a history 
deemed to work in lockstep with the will of God, and anything that 
resists or challenges Jacobus’ vision of life terrifies him to the core.
Whereas Jacobus’ representations of indigenous life actively di-
vests it of value on religious and metaphysical grounds, one can argue 
Coetzee’s satire works to imaginatively invest it with value. Jacobus’ 
representation of the Khoikhoi camp, quoted in detail above, works on 
two levels: on one hand, we receive an apparently authoritative ethno-
graphic account of the camp; on the other, we hear a different voice, 
one that quietly insists on the beauty of a life dignified by its material 
and spiritual austerity. Jacobus sees the apex of a “Hottentot” hut as 
“nothing but a smoke hole,” which violently forecloses what we may 
imagine the author invites the reader to imagine: how the opening in 
the apex of the hut allows the “Hottentot abed a barred view of the 
night sky” (77). Whether the opening “has led to neither a special rela-
tionship with the sky-gods nor a Hottentot astrology” (101), as Jacobus 
arrogantly assumes, seems beside the point. What matters and seems to 
be of inestimable value is that we are invited to imagine the life of the 
“Hottentot” otherwise, to maybe see what Jacobus’ vision of life denies: 
that there is value in a life shorn of ultimate meaning or religious signif-
icance. Existence itself thus seems to be accorded a kind of power and 
significance that unsettles the position of the reader vis-à-vis Jacobus’ 
assertions to the contrary. Precisely what the being of the Khoikhoi 
is—whether he or she is in possession of an aesthetic sense, the capacity 
for philosophical contemplation, or religious ecstasy while viewing the 
night sky—remains an open question. While Coetzee raises doubts and 
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questions on the authority of Jacobus’ mode of seeing, he also denies 
himself the authority to represent the being of the Khokhoi in defini-
tive terms. Thus Coetzee strategically opens the reader to a mode of 
seeing that is ethical precisely inasmuch as it is open to the ambiguities 
of literary interpretation. And perhaps it is the desirability of interpre-
tive closure that Coetzee’s writing powerfully unsettles in this particular 
textual instance. 
Coetzee, it seems, is profoundly attracted to this mode of writing, 
which may explain his deep admiration of the style of writing Samuel 
Beckett practiced. In an introduction to Beckett’s poems, short stories, 
and criticism, Coetzee writes: 
Beckett was an artist possessed by a vision of life without con-
solation or dignity or promise of grace, in the face of which our 
only duty—inexplicable and futile, but a duty nonetheless—is 
not to lie to ourselves. It was a vision to which he gave expres-
sion in language of a virile strength and intellectual subtlety 
that marks him as one of the great prose stylists of the twenti-
eth century. (Introduction, xiv)
Coetzee equates Beckett’s style and vision with a profoundly ascetic con-
sideration of human dignity, and one cannot help but wonder whether 
the philosophical outlook of this particular writer can be said to express 
itself in Dusklands. Might there be a connection between Coetzee’s sin-
cere admiration of Beckett’s style, the vision of human life it implies 
(the moral duty it demands?), and the value he wishes to impute to the 
Khoikhoi people? Over and against the religious fanaticism, acquisitive 
instincts, and vainglory we are made to see in Jacobus, Coetzee’s entic-
ingly gnomic renderings of the indigene’s mode of being-in-the-world 
suggests as much. One might even speculate that the indigene is figured 
as a model for the sustaining and sustainable vision of life Coetzee di-
vines in the work of Beckett. Considered in this light, Jacobus might be 
considered as a slave to a vision of human destiny that is as ethically and 
aesthetically sterile as it is unsustainable. Furthermore, Jacobus’ vision, 
falsified as it is by Coetzee’s exacting satire, is reduced to the status of a 
risibly destructive fiction.
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Interestingly, the fiction of the “human” as central actor in a world 
ordered and designed by divine fiat is challenged during Jacobus’ en-
counters with the Namaqua people on his way to hunt elephants. In 
addition to Coetzee’s representation of Jacobus’ enslavement to history, 
Coetzee tactically strips away his dignity by reducing him to the status 
of an animal body. Jacobus suffers a painful exodus from a world of pure 
representation into a world of undeniable contingency; ultimately he 
is, in a manner, thrown into a world without religious consolation or 
meaningful design. The stripping process begins shortly after he offers 
“gifts and promises of friendship” to the Namaqua people with hopes 
to obtain permission to pass beyond their village to harvest ivory from 
the carcasses of elephants; however, after succumbing to dysentery, his 
ironclad control over his servants is provisionally suspended (Coetzee, 
Dusklands 66). While his Khoikhoi servants let down their guard and 
yield to a riotous night of dancing, drinking, and sex, his cart is stolen 
along with its contents. Upon waking early in the morning, realizing 
what has transpired and how defenseless he is—without food, with-
out guns, without manpower—Jacobus yearns to make his way back 
to “civilization.” Before he does, he is disabused of illusions of godlike 
omnipotence and control—over the land, his servants, the indigenous 
peoples he encounters, his passions, and, by implication, his reason. 
As his ego defenses are pared away, Jacobus’ physical and psychologi-
cal vulnerability is laid bare; he learns what it is like to be treated like 
an animal—or what it means to be on the wrong side of history. This 
engenders feelings of helpless abjection, a mortifying corrective to his 
heroic pretense of invulnerable masculinity. Insult is added to injury 
when, after he attempts to reassert his will and authority to regain the 
service of his men and retrieve his stolen goods, he is tortured and 
beaten by the Namaqua people: “Naked and filthy I knelt in the middle 
of the ring with my face in my hands, stifling my sobs in the memory 
of who I was” (90). After he survives the altercation, he wonders, “With 
what new eyes of knowledge .  .  . would I see myself, now that I had 
been violated by the cackling heathen. Would I know myself better?” 
(97). After being reduced from a “well set up elephant hunter to a white-
skinned Bushman,” Jacobus yearns to reestablish his dignity, which is 
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to say his control over himself and his surroundings (99). After he re-
turns to “civilization” and enlists the service of the colonial authorities 
to return to the site of his abjection, he engages in a genocidal reprisal, 
exercising his will on the putative cause of his disgrace. After he murders 
his servants for the sin of insubordination, Jacobus is temporarily addled 
with doubt: “How do I know that Johannes Plaatje, or even Adonis, not 
to speak of the Hottentot dead, was not a world of delight closed off 
to the senses? May I have not killed something of inestimable value?” 
(106; emphasis added). The lines evoke William Blake’s The Marriage 
of Heaven and Hell, where the poet asks, “How do you know but ev’ry 
Bird that cuts the airy way, / Is an immense world of delight, clos’d by 
your senses five?” (Blake 35). Jacobus, if only for a short spell, agonizes 
over the question as to whether he has indeed annihilated a world of 
sensation and delight that his heartlessly narrow subjective world seems 
so disturbingly unable to allow. It is a bracing moment, for his act of 
violence initiates a degeneration from a risibly confident position of 
stoic rationality to one of overwhelming self-doubt that merely verges 
on sympathy—a potentially transformative sympathy that, instead of 
reading so-called animal bodies as the unregenerate locus of a “fallen 
humanity,” plunged in wickedness and sin, reads them as sacred, pre-
cisely because they are open to and affected by the beauty and ineffable 
complexity of the material world. The fact that Jacobus’s identity is mo-
mentarily unsettled by this intimation of similitude indicates a kind 
of power within himself that he is at pains to disavow—the power of a 
potentially shared sensation of the joy of “being.” Nevertheless, his fear 
of being drawn into the sphere of passionate feeling—a realm of affec-
tive life that bears the ideological stigma of the “feminine” or “animal” 
in Enlightenment societies—binds him to an alienated form of mascu-
linity that wholly undercuts his capacity for sympathy, fellowship, and 
meaningful community. The community with which he identifies—the 
Christian, European community of rational beings, ethically sterile as it 
is—deifies a form of reason (or power) that is illimitable as long as com-
passion or pity does not stand in its way. However, by delineating the 
tragic consequences of Jacobus’ alienation—from himself, others, the 
living, extra-human, material world—Dusklands, bleak and pessimistic 
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as it may seem, locates our capacity for fellow-feeling within the body, 
animality, and the senses, which activate and enliven the passions and 
connect us to overwhelmingly beautiful, mysterious, and fragile worlds 
that remain just beyond the gaze of reason. 
“The Thought of Her Played Uneasily on People’s Minds”: 
Coloniality and Animality in Richard Flanagan’s Wanting
Flanagan’s Wanting dramatizes the European settler’s mixed reactions 
to Australia, rendering a nuanced account of the settler’s ambivalence 
with respect to the novelty of its ecology. Australia’s “ceaseless vegeta-
tion,” “endless nameless mountains,” and “mapless rivers” both enchant 
and repel the novel’s British cast of settlers (Flanagan 172). Flanagan 
also conveys how the settlers’ attempts to settle an unsettling place—
and, by implication, master alterity through the orders of thought and 
language—are regularly rebuffed by Australian ecology. The narrator 
frequently suggests how disconcerting this particular ecological space 
may have appeared to the European settler, describing it as a “weird 
land predating time, with its vulgar rainbows, its vile, huge forests and 
bizarre animals that seemed to have been lost since Adam’s exile” (172). 
Thus Flanagan’s Australia is imagined to be in possession of a power 
that resists the settler’s anxious attempts to master feelings of cultural 
dislocation.12 To complicate matters, the novel stages how the abo-
riginal peoples of Australia confound the settler’s inherited notions of 
the human’s supposedly transcendent role with respect to nature. Like 
Dusklands, Wanting imagines the violence of the colonial encounter as 
a result of the anxiety and fear that emerges amidst European settlers’ 
perplexed reactions to the indigene’s unabashed animal nature. While 
both texts insinuate that these destructive passions are ego-driven de-
fenses against the recognition of kinship with the indigene, Wanting is a 
touch more explicit in its diagnosis and critique of the settler mentality. 
Flanagan adeptly tracks ecophobia and shows how the settlers’ self-rep-
resentations, supplemented as they are by the discursive animalization 
of aboriginals, reflect an inauthentic relation to their own animality, 
vulnerability, and mortality. Inasmuch as the body of the indigene pow-
erfully reminds the settler of his inauthenticity, the reader is able to 
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see why the aboriginal mode of being-in-the-world, which is uniquely 
embedded in Australian ecology, is so unsettling to his/her pretensions 
to god-like transcendence.13
Flanagan’s fiction speculatively rewrites the experiences of several his-
torical personages: the Chief Protector of Aborigines, George Augustus 
Robinson; Charles Dickens; the explorer and former governor of 
Tasmania, Sir John Franklin; and his wife, Lady Jane. Since the episodes 
on the English author fall outside the scope of my reading, I will pre-
dominantly focus on Robinson, with passing reference to the Franklins, 
particularly their relations with the orphaned aboriginal girl, Mathinna, 
who was taken into the Franklins’ care for a brief spell—and subse-
quently abandoned—shortly after Sir John had taken up his post as 
governor of Tasmania.
Robinson is introduced as the “The Protector” of a group of aborigi-
nals who have been sent to the camp of Wybalenna on Flinders Island 
in the aftermath of the Black War. He has been commissioned with the 
task, as the narrator states, of “raising his sable charges to the level of 
English civilization” (2). Shortly after the camp doctor succumbs to a 
fatal case of dysentery, Robinson is compelled to perform the role of sur-
geon. Meanwhile a mysterious disease has spread throughout the camp, 
and Robinson is aggrieved to discover his training in science is miserably 
inadequate to the task of healing the afflicted. When Mathinna, the 
daughter of the aboriginal chieftain, Towterer—renamed King Romeo 
by Robinson—rushes to inform him her father is gravely ill, he proceeds 
to his hut to assess the severity of the situation:
Even before he was inside, the Protector was beset by a strong 
odour of muttonbird grease, unwashed bodies and a fear—
wordless, nameless—that somehow this rotting stench related 
to him, to his actions, his beliefs. Sometimes the idea would 
come to his mind that these people he loved so much . . . these 
people whom he had brought to God’s light were yet dying in 
some strange way, in consequence of him. He knew it was an 
irrational idea. A perverse, impossible idea. . . . But he could 
not stop the idea returning again and again. (Flanagan 11–12; 
emphasis added)
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Robinson’s consciousness is compelled to mediate between the empiri-
cal and the abstract. Two kinds of knowledge are in perpetual conflict: 
sensuous, affective knowledge and a sort of cognitive, schematic knowl-
edge that informs his identity as a Christian and a man of science. One 
discerns a dynamic interplay between a semi-conscious knowledge of 
self and world that threatens to undermine his identity as a figure of pa-
ternalistic authority, and the narrator keys in on the role repression plays 
in the maintenance of his identity over and against the threat of alterity. 
Note that he initially senses a “wordless, nameless” threat to self, which 
is then mastered by a cognitive translation of sense into “irrational,” 
“perverse,” “impossible” ideas (12). Though the empirical is domesti-
cated by an ostensibly rational mediation of alterity—both without and 
within—his attempts to allay the threat of affective knowledge fail, for 
the idea that he is somehow responsible for the suffering at Wybalenna 
returns to him with an affective intensity that the operations of reason 
can never fully dispatch.
The dissonance between embodied knowledge and what is presumed 
to count as rational arguably testifies to the white settler’s experience of 
himself as precariously situated between an ideational world that refers 
to Europe and an experiential world that fails to square with the former. 
To illustrate, as Robinson anxiously follows Mathinna to King Romeo’s 
hut, he is reminded of his official duties: “to accustom them [the abo-
riginals] to English domesticity and to break them away from their own 
rude windbreaks” (10–11). As he makes his way, he is afflicted by a sense 
of his mission as futile and vain, then reflects: 
[I]f one didn’t think of the white beach behind, red-bouldered 
and leathery kelp-rimed, or the woodlands beyond, strange 
and twisted; if one just ignored this wretched wild island on 
which they sat at the edge of the world and instead concentrat-
ed on these buildings—it was possible to see that the two rows 
of tenements looked for all the world like some newly built 
street in a modern town like Manchester. (11)
Robinson’s wistful analogy is possible, yes; but the possibility requires 
the suspension of sense and a denial of contingency—or that which 
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remains just beyond the “edge” of a “world” defined by colonial concep-
tions of space and time, order and reason (11). The passage underscores 
Robinson’s repression of the “wild,” which Flanagan suggests is some-
how threatening to the values of English civilization. A terrible irra-
tionality drives him to deny what a disinterested observer cannot. The 
repression of the alterity of the Tasmanian wilderness—and the affective 
intensities it generates—must be mastered for Robinson to consolidate 
his sense of duty and the identity it confers.
Robinson’s faith in the virtue of his role as Protector, in the rational 
efficacy of science and medicine, in his ability to convert the aboriginals 
to Christianity, and, most importantly, in the God to whom he prays 
and defers in times of difficulty, is profoundly unsettled as he bleeds 
Towterer in a desperate attempt to save his life. As he dreads the great 
chieftain’s imminent demise, his uneasy faith in the redeeming powers 
of science gives way to prayer: “‘Lead, kindly Light, amid th’ encircling 
gloom; lead Thou me on!’” (14; emphasis in original). As Robinson’s faith 
in the powers of reason diminishes, his faith in the efficacy of prayer 
diminishes shortly thereafter. The event of Towterer’s death exceeds 
Robinson’s intellectual grip, thus attenuating the authority of scientific 
and religious explanations of what is afoot: indeed Flanagan suggests 
Robinson’s extreme investment in reason and God amounts to a non-
rational, visceral attachment to ideation that unduly inhibits his im-
agination, thus estranging him from reality. As Mathinna looks into his 
eyes, mystified by his strange incantations, Robinson abruptly pauses 
and searches his mind for a different tack: “Unsettled, he searched for a 
new rhythm of words to soothe his nerves” (15). Again, he reverts to the 
language of science, as if to reassure the frightened girl of his authority: 
“Now is the period in which King Romeo’s pulmonary system will find 
its equilibrium. . . . Whereby well-being . . . such that blood . . . ” (15). 
Robinson’s anxious attempts to regain his authority are redoubled when 
his gaze alights on Mathinna once again: “Mathinna looked down at 
her naked feet, and so too for a moment did the Protector, then feeling 
an embarrassment verging on inexplicable shame, he looked back and 
away, and walked out of the hut into the relief of the cold sea air” (15). 
As he leaves the hut, he feels “angry,” but “his anger perplexe[s] him” 
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(15). He is angry for the contingency of the late doctor’s demise and 
the Governor’s failure to expeditiously replace him, and yet he is proud 
of “his own ability as a man of medicine . . . he, a layman, a carpenter, 
self-reliant and self-made and self-taught, the very triumph of self ” (16). 
Robinson’s heroic belief in the powers of reason, of hard work, in the in-
defatigable value of self-assertion with a view to the good, is destabilized 
by his apprehension of the force of contingency in a world that resists 
his self-representations. The mere sight of Towterer’s physical abjection 
unsettlingly drives the reality of human vulnerability and mortality to 
the quick, and while he is reduced to a state of extreme anxiety and 
fear, his field of vision inadvertently hits upon Mathinna’s feet, which 
engenders a naked, heart-stopping sense of shared vulnerability. A kind 
of sympathy happens to Robinson that is far from ordinary, for it is tied 
to a sense of shame that, inexplicable as it may be to him, is artfully sug-
gested to bear importantly on his prior relations with Towterer—and, 
more broadly, the aboriginal peoples of Australia. Mathinna’s naked feet 
complexly symbolize these relations, which is probably why Robinson 
reflexively turns away in embarrassment.
Aside from the example above, Mathinna’s feet are referred to on so 
many occasions that it cannot escape the reader’s notice. The trope, 
naked feet, reinscribes colonial discourse’s derogation of the body of the 
indigene. The first term, naked, is consistently made to signify physi-
cal vulnerability—a condition of being potentially exposed to harm or 
death, although it also works to suggest a lack of artifice. And yet it 
signifies, too, a quality of openness to the mystery and complexity of 
human experience, in spite of its unsettling ambiguities. Additionally, 
the second term of the trope, feet, which denotes a part of human anat-
omy that connects one to the ground, implies a quality of unassuming 
worldliness: which is to say they stand for a kind of earthy humility 
that shames the settler’s pretenses to transcendence. Mathinna’s naked 
feet stand for an authentic relation to human animality that possesses 
the power to create a conversion of sensibility in the settler: one that 
Flanagan imagines to be as existentially attractive as it is demanding 
and frightening, namely because of the colonizer’s vexed relation to his 
embodiment and the destabilizing force of the passions, not to men-
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tion the awareness of human animality, vulnerability, and mortality the 
colonial encounter so viscerally intensifies. In other words, Flanagan’s 
representations of Mathinna’s feet are charged with a heavily affective 
signifying power that threatens to depose the self-flattering certitudes 
of colonial identity.
Flanagan’s representations of Mathinna offer a substantive alterna-
tive to the identity of the colonizer. He inscribes her feet with a power 
to know, experience, and value the world without recourse to abstract 
justifications or the consoling mediations of language. One is given to 
understand her feet as a source of joyous vitality and connection with 
the natural world. The following description conveys as much quite 
beautifully:
A small girl ran through the wallaby grass almost as high as 
her. How she loved the sensation of the soft threads of fine 
grass feathering beads of water onto her calves, and the feel of 
the earth beneath her bare feet, wet and mushy in winter, dry 
and dusty in summer. She was seven years old, the earth was 
still new and extraordinary in its delights, the earth still ran up 
through her feet to her head into the sun. (9)
The primary mode through which Mathinna receives the world is sensa-
tion and feeling. The passage implies she does not differentiate herself 
from her surroundings. Her feet ground her connection with the natu-
ral world, so that her physical being is shot through with uninhibited 
delight. The passage obviously valorizes passion and sensation, espe-
cially since they ground a connection between her body and the mate-
rial world. For the world is not mediated through abstraction; rather, 
her experience is one of embodied, affective immediacy.14 The fact that 
Flanagan lyrically emphasizes Mathinna’s affective attachment to the 
world of nature and animals—coupled with the fact that Mathinna, like 
most other aboriginal characters, does not make superior distinctions 
between the human and the nonhuman—dramatically articulates the 
author’s visceral aversion to anthropocentric, ecophobic value-systems 
that deny the value experience of indigenous peoples, not to mention 
nonhuman animals.15
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The scene described above evocatively parallels another scene that re-
flects Robinson’s earliest experiences with the aboriginal people, namely 
Mathinna’s father, Towterer. Given that Robinson’s complex affective 
responses to Mathinna’s naked feet occur during the scene of her fa-
ther’s death, one can speculate whether his overwhelming experience of 
shame and grief subsequent to Towterer’s demise is implied to be addled 
by the memory of his earliest experiences with the man, his people, 
and Australian ecology. For Flanagan’s poignant, affectionate rendering 
of Mathinna’s uniquely authentic relation to her body, which is sug-
gested to enable her receptivity to the beauty of nonhuman exterior-
ity, is artfully instantiated in Robinson himself well before Towterer’s 
untimely death. Like Mathinna, Robinson is opened, albeit briefly, to a 
mode of receptivity in himself for which he feels profoundly indebted to 
Towterer, the aborigines, and Mathinna. 
The narrator introduces the scene of Robinson’s short-lived conver-
sion of sensibility with a telling conversation that takes place with the 
Franklins. Robinson is regaling the new governor of Tasmania, Sir John 
Franklin, and his wife, Lady Jane, with an account of his first encoun-
ters with the aboriginals. Lady Jane has already expressed interest in the 
possibility of adopting Mathinna, whom she learns has recently become 
orphaned due to the loss of her mother, Wongerneep, and her father, 
Towterer. Robinson, upon Lady Jane’s request to know the specifics 
of Mathinna’s family history, proceeds to unwind a tale of his friend-
ship with Towterer as it evolved amidst “the sylvan forests and sublime 
beaches of western Van Diemen’s Land” (56). It is an enchanting tale 
that, as the narrator nevertheless insists, does not convey “King Romeo’s 
true story”—nor does it speak the truth of Robinson’s friendship with 
Towterer (58), for Robinson aims to impress Lady Jane with a story 
that accords with his reputation as a heroic conqueror of the wild and 
Christian redeemer of benighted, savage souls. Nevertheless, Robinson’s 
intuition of his complicity in the deaths of “his” people and the destruc-
tion of their culture returns with shattering insistence. As he spins his 
yarn, his doubts about the virtues of handing Mathinna into the care 
of the Franklins are addled by the memory of a virtually transforma-
tive experience with Towterer—the selfsame memory that is implied to 
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affect him while his vision encounters Mathinna’s naked feet earlier in 
the narrative. 
Robinson recalls but does not bother to narrate to the Franklins how, 
upon his first acquaintance with aboriginals, “the natives felt [his] limbs 
all over, trying to ascertain if he had bones, if he were a ghost” (59). They 
begin to dance and sing and, after considerable hesitation, Robinson 
gives into their insistence that he undress and join them. “Overcome 
by a logic he didn’t understand,” he dances, “momentarily beset by the 
terrifying idea that this was what he truly desired in life” (60). “Naked 
. . . leaping, stamping, flying,” the man finds himself “lost in a strange 
abandon” (60). He is startled to wonder whether this experience is the 
“true reward” for his mission in the wilderness rather than the prestige 
and “money” he would be granted for bringing the natives in from the 
wild (60). For the first time in his life he feels “open to everything,” 
“alive to other humans and to himself in a way he had never known” 
(60). However, this feeling of delightful abandon “could not last” (60). 
For his feeling of radical freedom pushes him into a provisional ap-
prehension of “something beyond himself,” something that makes “no 
sense,” “something beyond understanding” (60). 
Later he recalls the experience as “ridiculous” and “wicked,” for it con-
travenes “what was expected of him and who he really was” (60). “The 
very reason he was there would not allow any resolution of the matter 
other than the capture of these blacks” and bringing them into a “world 
where no one danced naked and no one opened themselves to others, 
and where all practiced closing down themselves and everything around 
them” (60–61). Robinson’s mind cannot recognize the experience as 
anything but aberrant contingency, a “disorder” and “heresy” that must 
be repressed and forgotten, for what he experiences, liberating though 
it may be, flies in the face of reason and religious belief, threatening to 
destabilize his vision of the world and, by extension, himself (61). 
Yet the vital force of his experience continues to tear at the tenuous 
fabric of his identity. His mind, though “ordered by religion,” falls prey 
to the suspicion that “God existed only as the ultimate obstacle between 
a man and his soul” (61; emphasis added). Robinson briefly intuits God 
as an unnecessary fiction that unduly inhibits the affective intensities 
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the material universe has the power to orchestrate. And for the short 
period he happens to be mastered by the dance, he sympathizes with 
the aboriginals, whose dance ritually celebrates the whole of existence in 
a way that obviates intellectual orderings or religious justifications. Far 
from ecophobic, Robinson’s provisionally ecstatic comportment toward 
the universe partakes of what one might call an ecological imagination; 
overwhelmed by this state of awareness, his identity as colonizer is made 
to seem scandalous, both to him and to the reader. Flanagan cogently 
underscores the power of affect and sensation, which undermines the 
order of reason, logic, and religious belief. God is posited as an obstacle 
to the soul, which is identified with the body, with feeling, sensation, the 
tactile sense, and Robinson’s instinctual drive to connect with others. 
Of course, colonial discourse derogates the body as wild and savage, 
the very locus of the beast within that threatens to disorder the rational 
soul, not to mention the social norms that guarantee the production, 
maintenance, and reproduction of colonial power. In other words, 
Robinson’s recollection of transformation by passion and sensation re-
veals the body’s power, the resistance it levies against the repressive force 
of hegemonic forms of reason. The body, associated as it is with a well-
nigh “uncontrollable animality” (55), is encoded in Robinson’s mind as 
a danger and a threat to his very sense of self, something he must guard 
against lest he lose control of the dignity of his person. That said, one 
can imagine why he looks away from Mathinna’s feet after he vainly 
tends to her dying father. It may be that her feet exhibit an animal 
magnetism that reminds him of Towterer’s impressively human élan and 
wisdom, the man who is, in a way, responsible for orchestrating the 
existentially rewarding experiences he fails to honor in the story he later 
tells the Franklins. It may be that her feet call to mind her innocence, 
her animality, her physical vulnerability, indeed her undeniable mortal-
ity: thus, the human’s humble animal origins, which, as the text insists, 
cannot be separated from the ecological. Faced with the presence of 
Towterer’s dying body, coupled with the memory of an experience that 
unsettled his faith in God, a universe designed for the benefit of human-
ity, and by turns leveled his belief in his own authority—his belief in 
the supposedly essential differences between colonizer and colonized—
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Robinson bows his head in shame, walks away from Mathinna and the 
corpse of her father, which both signifies the utter finality of death and 
intimates the death of the aboriginal way of life: its unique culture, its 
world view, which he feels/knows to be of inestimable value. In other 
words, by abandoning the sight of Mathinna and Towterer, he abandons 
himself to the seemingly unremitting logic of settler history. 
Robinson cannot dignify the true story of his friendship with Towterer 
in his own language. Friendship with the indigene defies the very logic 
upon which coloniality subsists: the repression of the body, desire, ani-
mality. Not long after his meeting with the Franklins runs its course, 
his thoughts turn to Mathinna, who has absconded from the camp 
after catching wind of the Franklins’ plans to adopt her: “deep inside, 
Robinson grew oddly troubled” (110). The narrator recounts Robinson’s 
qualms on giving the girl up; he is unsettled by a nameless quality he 
perceives in the Franklins: “there was about Sir John something that 
Robinson, ever a keen student and petitioner of power, could not quite 
put into words” (110). Yet he rationalizes his decision to yield her up to 
the hands of fate:
If the Protector was loath to part with that for which the 
Franklins asked . . . he was nevertheless succeeding in persuad-
ing himself that he would hardly be abandoning the child to 
the scum of the penal colony. Rather, he told himself, it was 
to the very finest flowers of England, disciplined in habit, re-
ligious in thought, scientific in outlook.  .  .  . And their self-
less goal? To raise the savage child to the level of a civilized 
Englishwoman. How could he deny anyone such an opportu-
nity? (111)
Ironically, Robinson sacrifices his most ennobling instincts to fiction, 
to power, to history, and disgracefully cobbles together the words that 
help him to accept the hand he plays in denying Mathinna her free-
dom. Toward the novel’s conclusion, several years after he had last 
seen Mathinna, who has been abandoned recently by the Franklins, he 
makes plans to return to England. He wonders “what had become of 
the experiment of the black princess, but all he met with were sorry 
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rumors” (231). Broken and crestfallen due to his failure to achieve that 
“most elusive accolade, greatness,” he imagines the possibility of re-
deeming himself by narrating the “strange history of [his] encounters 
with the savages of Australia and Van Diemen’s Land” (231). Maybe a 
book would garner him “celebrity, honours, money” (231). Vanity, he 
thinks: “No one was interested. Nor, ultimately, he had discovered, was 
he” (231). For what, after all, would he be commemorating? Strange, 
outlandish, impossible tales. His thoughts turn to the past: “He heard 
strange chanting. Saw a man naked dancing between the stars and the 
earth. Remembered rivers, a dark child at his door” (231). Unsettled by 
the memory of Mathinna, informed as it is by strange, nameless feelings, 
Robinson is haunted by the past, by an alternative history that must, for 
the time being, remain untold. 
Similar to the conclusion of Dusklands, Wanting ends on a tragic note. 
Jacobus Coetzee and George Augustus Robinson, while they think of 
themselves as manly, heroic conquerors of nature, the frontier, and 
peoples who stand in the way of progress and history, are nevertheless 
by turns addled by unsettling feelings of loss, regret, and self-doubt. 
Though they think they have sacrificed themselves for a noble cause—
for the nation, for civilization, for the sake of the destiny of “Man” 
sanctioned and willed by God—they cannot withstand deeply troubling 
doubts on the value of their sacrifice. For their sacrifice is haunted by 
the specter of what the logic of settler histories demands: the sacrifice of 
the indigene, the animal, of nature, sympathy, and the opportunity to 
embrace the possibility of a more authentic, sustaining, and sustainable 
vision of life. Coetzee’s and Flanagan’s speculative rewritings of settler 
histories, bleak and unsettling as they are, arguably stand for the crea-
tion of a novel set of values that simultaneously address the legacies of 
imperial history and our embattled environmental present. The fact that 
they render settler histories with such alarming honesty is valuable: to 
frankly acknowledge the violence of the past is a value in itself, especially 
when the failure to look at it seriously may guarantee its insidious con-
tinuation in the present. But what seems especially noteworthy is how 
both texts seek to find grounds for hope in their speculative renderings 
of the colonial encounter. By imagining the ambivalence at the heart 
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of the colonial encounter, they show how the colonizer’s more redeem-
ing social instincts are disabled and co-opted by historical discourse; at 
the same time, they dramatize the body’s resistance to the social, politi-
cal, religious, and economic logics of colonialism. Both authors insist 
we consider the power of the body’s refusal of ideology. To stage the 
body’s power in all its living complexity, without recourse to maudlin 
simplification, indicates yet another formulation of value that demands 
our attention. For, as Coetzee and Flanagan show, the body—our very 
animality—has a way of reminding us of our physical vulnerability, our 
mortality, the very finite nature of our existence in this world; precisely 
because of this, we are reminded of our kinship with other sentient 
beings. To refuse the basis of our kinship, Coetzee and Flanagan suggest, 
is scandalous, both for ethical and aesthetic reasons. Over and against 
our failure to acknowledge animality and its implications, they proffer 
the value of the sympathetic imagination, which may yet have the power 
to reorder our relations with nature, not as aggrieved antagonists, but as 
joyful, affirmative participants.
Notes
 1 Armstrong sees the neglect of animals in postcolonial studies as a critical limita-
tion: “Concerned as it is with the politics of historical and contemporary rela-
tions between ‘Western’ and other cultures since 1492 or thereabouts, postcolo-
nial studies has shown little interest in the fate of the nonhuman animal” (413). 
For Armstrong, to posit the nonhuman animal as a locus of ethical concern 
does not mean we have to sacrifice our commitments to human justice; ethically 
reconfiguring human-animal relations is one way to ameliorate contemporary 
social and environmental problems, which he links with the intellectual lega-
cies of colonialism and imperialism—in particular, the human-animal binary of 
colonial discourse.
 2 Oliver comments on Agamben’s concept of the anthropological machine, a sym-
bolic economy that idealizes “human” characteristics, powers, and potentials vis-
à-vis a derogated “animality.” She states: “The human-animal divide . . . is not 
only political but also sets up the possibility of politics. Who is included in hu-
man society and who is not is a consequence of the politics of ‘humanity,’ which 
engenders the polis itself ” (1). 
 3 In White Writing: On the Culture and Letters in South Africa, Coetzee examines 
the varied written responses of settlers to indigenous society and culture. Noting 
how the settlers’ obsessive preoccupation with the spiritually redeeming powers 
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of work informs their derogatory accounts of the indigene, he speculates on the 
philosophical and ethical costs of the settlers’ exalted estimation of the value of 
work: 
  Nowhere in the great echo chamber of the Discourse of the Cape is a 
voice raised to ask whether the life of the Hottentot may not be a version 
of life before the Fall . . . a life in which man is not yet condemned to eat 
his bread in the sweat of his brow, but instead may spend his days dozing 
in the sun, or in the shade when the sun grows too hot, half-aware of the 
singing of the birds and the breeze on his skin, bestirring himself to eat 
when hunger overtakes him, enjoying a pipe of tobacco when it is avail-
able, at one with his surroundings and unreflectively content. The idea 
that the Hottentot may be Adam is not even entertained for the sake of 
being dismissed (on the grounds, say, that the Hottentot does not know 
God). Certainly no one dreams of asking whether what looks like Hot-
tentot dolce far niente may not be the mere outward aspect of a profound 
Hottentot contemplative life. (19) 
 4 Though Coetzee uses the term Hottentot for purposes of historical authenticity, 
one should note his use of racist nomenclature is used in a non-racist way to 
deconstruct settler ideology. The term Khoikhoi has displaced the derogatory use 
of Hottentot in contemporary critical discourse.
 5 In Modernism, Narrative, and Humanism, Sheehan connects the “Cartesian tra-
dition of reason, logic, cognition, [and] reflexivity” with the “discourse of the 
modern subject” (6). One of the underlying tenets of this discourse is “the idea 
of autonomy, the belief that ‘man is the measure of all things’” (6). The idea of 
the subject as “above” nonhuman exteriority, including the body and the pas-
sions, works to create a form of reason that, for Sheehan, is fundamentally an-
thropocentric: “For man to be the measure of all things, he must place himself at 
the center of the world and make it ‘his’” (6). The central point I wish to make 
is that Coetzee’s representation of Jacobus’ point of view underscores the extent 
to which it cannot contain or master contingency or what falls outside anthro-
pocentric systems of representation or forms of reason. 
 6 Huggan and Tiffin submit that, in order to become truly “post-imperial,” “a 
reimagining and reconfiguration of the human place in nature necessitates an 
interrogation of the category of the human itself and the ways in which the con-
struction of ourselves against nature—with the hierarchizations of life forms that 
construction implies—has been and remains complicit in colonialist and racist 
exploitation from the time of the conquest to the present day” (6; emphasis in 
original).
 7 Deane notes how imperialism enlists Enlightenment philosophical discourse to 
exalt Eurocentric notions of reason against the so-called primitive body of the 
colonized: “the abstraction of reason led to the liquidation of the sensory, sensu-
ous world of the primitive (or natural); this too fed imperial theory since the 
113
Rewr i t i ng  Hi s t o r y /An ima l i t y
occupants of colonized territories were taken to be immersed in such a world 
and therefore incapable of, or at least insufficiently evolved toward, the rational 
condition of the European” (357).
 8 Wolfe coordinates the figure of vision with the discourse of reason that, as he 
says, maintains the full transcendence of the human with respect to its animal-
ity. In the interest of reinscribing the human-animal nexus, Wolfe wants to 
“recast the figure of vision (and therefore the figure of the human with which 
it is ineluctably associated) to resituate it as only one sense among many in a 
more general—and not necessarily human—bodily sensorium” (3). One should 
add that Coetzee presciently anticipates Wolfe’s posthumanist ethical project in 
Dusklands. It is also worth noting that Coetzee’s posthumanism is more vividly 
articulated in The Lives of Animals and Elizabeth Costello, experimental novels 
that decry the ethical limitations of the discourse of reason and extol the virtues 
of sympathy.
 9 I derive my notion of reason as “cognitive firewall” from Descartes’ The Passions 
of the Soul. In the section, “That the exercise of virtue is a supreme remedy for 
the Passions,” Descartes installs reason as a virtue with the power to withstand 
“the most vigorous assaults of the Passions” (101). In his analysis of the power of 
reason, Descartes casts the passions as bestial threats to the integrity of the self 
and the order of representation (or rational science).
 10 Jacobus’ blindness to the logic of indigenous social and cultural forms, I am 
claiming, is a function of his enslavement to what Derrida calls “metaphysics—
white mythology, which . . . reflects the culture of the West, logos, that is, the 
mythos of reason” (213).
 11 Attridge says Jacobus “exhibits the prejudices of the eighteenth-century Dutch 
frontier-dweller in South Africa, prejudices that allow him to treat the native 
inhabitants of the country as an inferior and, if necessary, expendable species” 
(15). He also mentions how Dusklands strategically demonstrates how these 
prejudices are determined by the “discourses of the ruling culture,” which are 
contested by the resistance of indigenous figures that call into question their 
“universalizing pretentions,” thereby compelling the reader to “recognize their 
historical origins and contingent existence” (13). In a similar move, Attwell 
claims Coetzee historicizes a “specific social identity” through Jacobus, a charac-
ter whose point of view is largely constituted by the discourse of philosophical 
rationalism (37). Attwell contends Coetzee “exposes the subject-positions and 
ethical duplicity that are masked by rationalism’s objectivist pretentions” (37). 
While Attridge and Attwell focus on Coetzee’s use of irony and satire to debunk 
the universalizing and objectivist pretentions of colonial discourse, I am arguing 
Dusklands evinces something more than a deconstructive enterprise: something 
along the lines of an ethical project that aims to subversively rearticulate the 
human-animal binary with a host of affirmative meanings and associations. For 
work that exemplifies this notion and reads Coetzee’s fiction through the insights 
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of ecofeminist philosophy and animal/animality studies, see Donovan’s “‘Mira-
cles of Creation’: Animals in J. M. Coetzee’s Work.” 
 12 The novelist, Grenville, explains how her research for her novel on nineteenth 
century settler colonialism, The Secret River, helped her to gain insight into the 
unsettling features of the Australian environment. She says she felt the need to 
feel firsthand what it might have been like to encounter the Australian wilder-
ness as a settler. After she attempts to re-enact the settler experience by camping 
in “the bush,” she explains how the environment affected her: “It was like a gi-
gantic breathing creature all around me, not hostile, but a being to which I was 
entirely irrelevant” (“Unsettling the Settler”). 
 13 Mason writes, “in the first law of ecology, everything is connected to everything 
else” (132). He also speculates whether notions of the ecological can be thought 
alongside the erotic, or “oikos” with “Eros” (132). Flanagan arguably takes up 
this consideration by suggesting that colonial desire, while driven to represent the 
other as immured in a reductively conceived animal body, is simultaneously at-
tracted to the indigene’s mode of being-in-the-world, which is attractive precisely 
because it is unburdened by ideology and thus open to an inner world of undif-
ferentiated, sensuous and affective intensities wrought in connection with local 
ecologies. Interestingly enough, Coetzee, as I have suggested above, is attracted 
to what one might call ecological being in his attempts to speculatively ascribe 
value to Khoikhoi modes of being-in-the-world in Dusklands: a move that is 
made more directly in White Writing. One should also add Coetzee’s figurations 
of the value of human animality are portrayed through his characterization of 
Michael K, who is described variously as “a soul blessedly untouched by doctrine, 
untouched by history,” and “a creature left over from an earlier age, like the coe-
lacanth or the last man to speak Yaqui” (The Life and Times of Michael K 151).
 14 Coetzee’s Elizabeth Costello articulates the potential ethical value of affective 
modes of knowing and engagement. She seems to insist that the discourse of rea-
son, which coordinates thought with being, unduly valorizes human intellection 
almost precisely as much as it derogates intuition, feeling, imagination, and the 
like. The ethical consequences of this valorization, she argues, have been—and 
still are—disastrous, both for racialized humans and animalized nonhumans. To 
counter this tendency in Western thought and culture, she coordinates joy with 
being, a capacity and power humans share with some (but not all) nonhuman 
animals. She states: 
  To thinking, cogitation, I oppose fullness, embodiedness, the sensation 
of being—not a consciousness of yourself as a ghostly reasoning machine 
thinking thoughts, but on the contrary a sensation—a heavily affective 
sensation—of being a body with limbs that have extension in space, of 
being alive to the world. This fullness contrasts starkly with Descartes’ 
key state [reason], which has an empty feel to it: the feel of a pea rattling 
around in a shell. (Coetzee, Elizabeth Costello 78) 
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 15 Though the scope of this section of my essay limits itself to Flanagan’s positive 
reinscriptions of indigenous modes of being-in-the-world, his sensitivity to the 
plight of nonhuman animals is indexed throughout the novel. Furthermore, the 
author’s sensitive portrayal of animal suffering and death is probably a function 
of his attunement to nonhuman animal subjectivity: various animals, including 
oxen, possums, wallabies, and parrots are represented to be in possession of the 
capacity for relatively complex forms of intra- and interspecies social interaction. 
However, most importantly, he seems especially attuned to nonhuman animals’ 
respective capacities for joy. One might argue Flanagan’s renderings of Math-
inna’s value experience are made to crucially depend on her non-rational, deeply 
affective attachments to various nonhuman animals. I borrow the phrase “value 
experience” from Whitehead. He uses the phrase to articulate a conception of 
morality that may extend itself beyond the human: “Everything has some value 
for itself, for others, and for the whole. This characterizes the meaning of actu-
ality. By reason of this character, constituting reality, the conception of morals 
arises. We have no right to deface the value experience which is the very essence 
of the universe. Existence, in its own nature, is the upholding of value intensity” 
(Whitehead 111).
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